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Abstract More than 5,000 Internet firms have failed
since the beginning of 2000. One common perception is
that the downturn in the economy drove many firms out
of business. But then, why have some firms survived? In
this research, we provide an empirical analysis by
examining how the business model characteristics of an
Internet firm affect its survival. We analyze a panel data
set of 130 public Internet firms using two different
techniques: non-parametric survival analysis, and the
semiparametric Cox proportional hazards model. We
characterize the survival rates throughout the lifetimes of
the public Internet firms in our sample. Our results reveal
that smaller firms that facilitate customer-provider inter-
actions, are transaction brokers, and that rely on
advertising as their primary source of revenue sources
have had a lower likelihood of bankruptcy or failure. In
addition, the detrimental effects on failing to serve as
interaction platforms for individuals and businesses, and a
larger firm size diminish over time as Internet firms
mature, and the weaker ones are forced out of the
marketplace. Our research also points out important
dimensions of an Internet firm’s business model that
affect its survival.
Keywords Business models  Competitive strategy 
Duration analysis  Empirical methods 
Internet firms  Strategic management 
Survival analysis
1 Introduction
Fueled by advances in information technologies (IT) in
the 1990s, Internet firms emerged to facilitate online
transactions and leverage unique characteristics that set
them apart from bricks-and-mortar businesses. The
emergence of Web portals, online financial sites, and
business-to-business (B2B) e-intermediaries has allowed
market entrants to benefit from the emerging digital
channel to deliver information and services that were not
previously available. According to Webmergers.com
[36], however, about 5,000 Internet companies shut down
or were acquired during the 3-year period from 2000 to
2003. Organizational ecologists [11, 14, 15, 22] and
evolutionists [2, 12] both argue that the most well-
adapted organizations survive in a competitive selective
environment. In the digital marketplace, how can we
understand the degree of a match between Internet firms’
business models and the digital channel, and how do
their selected business model characteristics affect sur-
vival? In addition, the hype around Internet firms in the
late 1990s and the subsequent large-scale failures dem-
onstrate that Internet firms went through their initial
R. J. Kauffman
W.P. Carey School of Business,
Arizona State University,
Tempe, AZ 95287, USA
e-mail: rkauffman@asu.edu
B. Wang (&)
College of Business Administration,
University of Texas-Pan American,
Edinburg, TX 78539, USA
e-mail: binwang@utpa.edu
123
Inf Technol Manage (2008) 9:215–232
DOI 10.1007/s10799-008-0040-3
Published in Information Technology and Management, September 2008, Volume 9, Issue 3, pp 215-232.
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10799-008-0040-3
development stages in a sensitive period. How did these
unique market conditions affect survival?1
Building upon previous interdisciplinary research on
organizational evolution and business failure, we provide
an empirical analysis of the drivers of Internet firm sur-
vival. We answer these questions:
• How can different theories contribute to our knowledge
of Internet-focused firm performance?
• What theory can we use to distinguish healthy Internet
firms from those near bankruptcy?
• Can we develop indices that gauge the suitability of the
characteristics of an Internet firm’s business model
relative to the Internet channel, and use them to explain
and predict survival?
Although research on firm survival can be conducted at
different levels, our focus is the firm-to-business process
level, where there are identifiable, controllable character-
istics that may affect survival. Similar to Barua et al. [10],
we define an Internet firm as one that mainly generates its
revenues from the Internet.2 By analyzing the duration of
130 public Internet firms after their initial public offerings
(IPOs), we obtained four major results. First, failures of
publicly traded Internet firms occurred between 1 and
6 years after their IPO. The reason we compare firms
starting from IPO issuance is because, in survival analysis,
observations are usually compared based on age, not on
calendar time. Second, the characteristics of a firm’s
business model and its use of the Internet affected survival.
The important dimensions include whether a firm serves as
an interaction platform for individuals and businesses and
is a transactional intermediary. Finally, the impact of
appropriate business model characteristics with the digital
channel on firm survival diminished over time, as the
competition intensified and only the stronger ones were
left. The results allow us to integrate theories and results
from previous research, and provide a theoretical per-
spective that identifies key dimensions of business model
characteristics that affect Internet firm survival.
A key managerial take-away from this research is the
importance of marketplace dynamics during periods when
Internet firms experienced a high probability of failure. We
also report on various aspects of Internet firms’ business
models that seem to have affected their survival. Even
though an Internet firm’s business model was difficult to
change once it is established, companies that tried to nur-
ture online communities with their websites enhanced their
chances of survival.
2 Literature and theory
We next discuss relevant theories that provide a conceptual
framework for understanding Internet firm morphing and
survival, and help us identify relevant indices for business
model characteristics in the digital channel that affect
survival. We first review the organizational ecology and
evolution literature. Next, we discuss the relevant literature
and the uniqueness of the digital channel that lead to our
development of indices for the suitability of business
model characteristics between the Internet firm and the
digital channel.
2.1 The organizational ecology and organizational
evolution literatures
The organizational ecology literature examines organiza-
tional populations through the lens of Darwinian selection
[11, 14, 15, 22]. The central research question the organi-
zational ecology literature tries to answer is why
organizations are different in their forms. According to this
theory, the external social, political, and economic envi-
ronments in which organizations exist have limited
resources available. This forms an environment in which
selection occurs. Only those organizations that are well
suited to the environment will be able to acquire the nec-
essary resources and survive. When environmental
conditions change, we observe organizational form chan-
ges as new organizational forms that best match the new
environment gradually gain dominance, while those that do
not are selected out. According to this literature, organi-
zational form changes usually occur soon after an
organization has been established, and thereafter organi-
zations exhibit increasing inertia and have a tendency to
maintain existing structures as they age.
The organizational evolution literature is similar to the
organizational ecology literature in that there is also a
selection process at work and only the fittest organizations
1 For example, the NASDAQ Composite Index increased by 238%
from 1,520 in the beginning of 1996 to its highest of 5,132 on March
10, 2000. Then within a short two and a half year period, it lost 78%
of its value and decreased to a low of 1,136 on October 9, 2002.
Seventy-nine out of our sample of 130 Internet firms went public
during the five-quarter period from the beginning of 1999 to the first
quarter of 2000, after which Internet firm IPOs dramatically fell in
number. The 6-month U.S. Treasury bill interest rate went from a high
of 6.25% in the third quarter of 2000 to a low of 0.94% in the second
quarter of 2004, further indicating the changing fundamentals of the
American economy.
2 Barua et al. [10] define a dotcom as a firm that generates 100% of
its revenues via the Internet. In another related study, they recognized
that Internet firms also generate revenues through traditional channels
and used 95% as the cutoff. In this research, we use 90% as the cutoff
point so that we are able to include in our sample companies that are
generally considered Internet firms by most observers of the digital
economy. The 95 and 100% levels for Internet-based revenue
generation actually leave out a number of well-known names among
these firms. Some examples are Garden.com and GlobalNet
Financial.com.
216 Inf Technol Manage (2008) 9:215–232
123
are likely to survive [2, 12]. However, the organizational
evolution literature focuses on a cycle involving variation,
selection, and retention. During the variation stage, new
organizations emerge and diversity increases. The selection
process determines that only the best-suited organizations
will be selected and survive. This further turns into the
retention process where the selected species are institu-
tionalized. As new variations emerge, a new cycle of
variation, selection, and retention starts. In addition, the
selection mechanism can occur at multiple levels, includ-
ing individuals, groups, organizations, populations, and
communities.
The organizational ecology and evolution literatures3
both emphasize the importance of the suitability between
an organization and its environment relative to the orga-
nization’s survival. They offer contrasts also. The main
difference between the two is that the organizational
ecology literature views organizational form as fixed at the
birth or shortly after the birth of a firm. On the other hand,
the organizational evolution literature views organizational
forms as changing continuously through cycles involving
variation, retention, and selection. In the digital market-
place, the degree of match between the business activities
of Internet firms and the digital channel will also be
important to their survival. We next discuss the relevant
literature and the unique aspects of the digital channel that
allow us to develop indices for how well-suited are the
characteristics of an Internet firm’s business model.
2.2 Unique aspects of the digital economy
Although existing theories of firm survival also apply to
Internet firms, the unique characteristics they possess point
out the inadequacy of just applying existing theories to
them without any adjustments or extensions. We propose a
set of indices to measure the suitability of the character-
istics of an Internet firm’s business model with the digital
channel, as a means to explain Internet firm survival.
The digital economy is unique in five aspects. First, the
Internet offers a basis for global connectivity and interac-
tion. A virtual location on the World Wide Web allows a
firm to easily reach more domestic and international cus-
tomers, as we have seen with the global expansion of
companies such as Amazon.com, Yahoo!, and Google. In
addition, the Internet allows companies to improve their
business processes and achieve more efficient and effective
operations in support of far-flung customers [7]. Although
these are advantages all Internet firms enjoy, some have
been taking advantage of this global interactivity and
offering services to facilitate the interaction among their
customers in special ways. For example, eBay has been
providing a marketplace that connects sellers and buyers
everyplace. Compared with local or special-purpose auc-
tions, where the number of participants rarely goes above a
few thousands and geographical barriers exist, eBay con-
nects millions of businesses and individuals from around
the world. Online communities such as Women.com and
eChapman.com target different demographics, allowing
people with similar interests to interact. YouTube.com
allows Internet users to express themselves and share
videos with each other. Many of these websites do not sell
their own products or provide their own content, but rather
they rely on user-generated content and serve as the plat-
forms that allow businesses and individuals to meet and
interact with each other. Such large-scale global connec-
tions among individuals and businesses are unprecedented
and impossible without the Internet, and increase the
business and social networks that firms and individuals
face. As a result, these business models take advantage of
global connectivity from the Internet, which increases their
suitability for the digital channel and their chances of
survival.4 Hence, we assert:
Hypothesis 1 (The Interaction Platform Hypothesis)
Internet firms that connect individuals and businesses and
serve as a platform for their interactions are more likely to
survive.5
Second, the Internet is not only a new battleground for
existing business models, but also a test bed of brand new
business models. Examples include search engines, portal
sites, and website hosting service providers. These business
3 For example, de Koning [18] uses the concept of survival of the
fittest to examine the success or failure of organizational collabora-
tions and acquisitions. Lawless and Finch [34] also examine how the
suitability of an organization’s strategy to its environment affects its
survival.
4 An interaction platform is not business model-specific. It can be a
B2B, B2C, or C2C firm, as long as it provides a platform that permits
individuals and businesses to interact with one another.
5 The reader should note that each of our hypotheses might include
two additional qualifiers, to ensure the accuracy in interpretation of
the tests that we carried out in this research. Our theoretical assertions
pertain to the time frame of our data, and should not be mistaken as
‘‘once and for all’’ assertions; as the times and the technologies
change, so will the predictions of theory change. In spite of many
changes that have occurred since the dotcom era, this actually is true
with different theories in many different industry settings. So,
although all of our hypotheses are stated in the present tense, it is
appropriate for the reader to think of the tests of theory that we will
conduct as having an historical or past tense flavor to them.
Nevertheless, we believe that the bulk of what we have asserted will
continue to be true. Still, there are changes and nuances that have
crept into the current online marketplace and the broader digital
economy that reflect the major efforts with reintermediation on the
part of well-established leading companies with very large resource
bases. As a result, we have seen pure-play Internet firms increasingly
combined with other more traditional firms, such as Pets.com with
PETsMART, and other emerging technology and emerging services
partners, such as eBay and Skype.
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models have emerged due to the Internet and they exist on
the Internet only. As a result, their positioning for the
digital channel is better. In addition, they compete in
breakthrough markets, where they provide brand new
products and services and face less competition from tra-
ditional businesses due to the nature of the changes they
bring to the marketplace [17]. In contrast, other business
models, such as online retailers and B2B marketplaces,
were not designed specifically for or due to the Internet.
These business models were shifted by entrepreneurial
firms from the offline channel to the online channel, so
their suitability to the digital channel was necessarily a
little worse.
This is also similar to the tenets of the product life cycle
(PLC) theory [20]. According to PLC theory, new startups
are more likely to survive when an industry is young and
competition is less intense. In contrast, when an industry is
mature and the dominant design has emerged, competition
is fierce and new firms face a higher likelihood of failure.
For Internet firms that employ brand new Internet-only
business models, they are the new entrants into new
industries where the dominant players are yet to emerge or
are in the process of emerging. Hence, they are more likely
to survive. In contrast, for businesses that adjust their
existing business models to the online environment, they
face fierce competition from established market leaders in
the offline channel.6 As a result, their likelihood of survival
is lower. Thus, we propose:
Hypothesis 2 (The New Internet-Only Business Model
Hypothesis) Internet firms that employ newly emerged
Internet-only business models are more likely to survive.
Third, the digital channel also enables a company to
provide a variety of products or services with different
suitability to Internet-based selling. Some provide digital
goods and services that can be directly delivered via the
Internet, thus are well suited to the digital channel.
Examples are online portal sites such as Yahoo! and
MSN.com that provide information and services which can
be directly accessed via the Internet. Another example is
eBay, which offers a marketplace for buyers and sellers,
but is not itself involved in order fulfillment. In addition,
MP3.com and Audible.com allow customers to download
digital content directly from the Internet, transforming the
ways that consumers can acquire entertainment and infor-
mation goods. Barua et al. [8, 9] report that digital product
dotcoms have achieved higher productivity than the
physical product firms that sell on the Internet. They
attribute the difference to a higher level of digitization of
business processes at digital product dotcoms and lower
operational costs. Electronic delivery substitutes for more
traditional approaches and it also is possible now for digital
product dotcoms to avoid the costs associated with holding
physical inventory. Physical products such as books, CDs,
and electronics all have to be shipped to customers. The
digital channel offers limited support for customer tryouts
of physical products, since the orders have to be physically
delivered to customers. The match between their business
model and the digital channel is worse as a result. Finally,
perishable products such as groceries, flowers, plants, and
gardening supplies have either limited delivery areas or
high delivery costs (or both), so their business models are
the least advantageous for the Internet firms that sell them.
This leads us to assert:
Hypothesis 3 (The Digital Goods Hypothesis) Internet
firms that sell digital goods that are more suited to the
digital channel are more likely to survive.
Fourth, the Internet offers lower transactional costs. The
digital channel allows intermediaries to match buyers and
sellers more efficiently and carry out the transactions at
lower costs due to higher levels of digitization and the
automation of their business processes [6]. If one compares
the costs online versus offline for such typical transactions
as checking bank account balances, trading stocks, and
paying bills, the costs online are just a fraction of those
offline [32]. Even though all Internet firms obtain the
advantages offered by the Internet, some firms are able to
leverage this advantage to a greater extent for profitability
and value creation. They are transaction brokers whose
business models involve the intermediation of transaction-
making. Their functions include supporting search, identi-
fying transaction partners, aiding in price discovery,
assisting with settlement over the digital channel and
indemnifying transaction completion and buyer/seller per-
formance [6, 16]. Our next hypothesis follows from these
observations:
Hypothesis 4 (The Transaction Broker Hypothesis)
Internet firms that are transaction brokers are more likely to
survive.
Fifth, advertising via the Web has become a major
source of revenues for many Internet firms. The digital
channel is a medium through which companies can com-
municate with their customers. When a Web site attracts
traffic, advertising revenue generation opportunities arise.
To Internet firms such as Yahoo! and Google, which pro-
vide their content and services to individuals for free,
advertising has become the most significant source of their
revenues. Along with these opportunities, however,
6 We want to point out that new Internet-only business models are not
equivalent to pure-play Internet firms. Examples of companies that
are pure-players, but did not use brand new business models are
Amazon.com and Buy.com. They only exist online, but they are
retailers. So their business models are not new; they existed before the
Internet.
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advertising-based revenue models present some challenges
to Internet firms. On the positive side, the ease of cus-
tomization on the Internet gives Web sites the opportunity
to provide targeted advertising, making the digital channel
even more attractive for advertisers. The customized dis-
play of advertisements at Google based on user-supplied
search keywords is one such example. In addition, for Web
sites that rely mainly on advertising for revenues, their
content and services are usually free. Such free services
attract Internet users, allowing these companies to accu-
mulate Web site traffic, increasing advertisers’ incentives
to advertise with them. On the negative side though,
Internet firms relying primarily on advertising for revenues
are vulnerable to fluctuations in corporate advertising
spending. After the stock market downturn in Spring 2000,
many businesses reduced their advertising expenditures. As
a result, Internet firms that used to provide their content for
free and to rely on advertising as revenues had to switch to
subscription-based business models [27]. When consumers
became unwilling to pay for previously free services, these
Internet firms experienced pressure. Despite the challenges
Internet firms have faced, advertising has proven to be a
reliable source of revenue for many due to the advantages
this source of revenues has offered. Hence, we argue:
Hypothesis 5 (The Advertising as Main-Source-of-
Revenue Hypothesis) Internet firms that rely on advertising
as their main source of revenues are more likely to survive
than those that do not.
We next discuss our empirical research approach, and
the statistical methods we use to test our hypotheses and
develop new knowledge in this research domain.
3 Empirical models and analysis approach
Our empirical analysis involves two steps. We first give
a visual representation of the survival patterns that our
sample of public Internet firms demonstrated. We then
model Internet firm survival in IPO time to support firm
age-based and calendar time-based analyses. IPO time is
the amount of time that has passed since the firm
established its capital base from public investors in the
stock market. Our methods are intended to triangulate to
support a rich and in-depth understanding of Internet
firm survival.
3.1 Duration modeling and survival analysis
Survival analysis is widely used in public health to study
the effectiveness of medical treatments on patients and in
criminology to examine patterns in criminal recidivism.
Several concepts are essential. The occurrence of an event
involves a failure process that starts from a certain point in
time, such as birth or the start of a treatment. Duration is
the elapsed time since the start of observation until the
occurrence of the event of interest or the end of the study
period, if the event does not occur and the subject is still at
risk [35]. Such an observation is said to be right-censored.
When an individual is still at risk right before time t, the
hazard rate is the instantaneous failure rate at time t.
Survival analysis is based on a stochastic failure process,
so observations are usually compared based on individual
durations, rather than calendar time.
Age-based firm comparisons eliminate the possibility
of learning effects associated with firm age. We use both
nonparametric and semiparametric survival analysis to
compare firms with the same number of quarters elapsed
since their IPOs.7 The survival function is the probability
that the firm’s duration will exceed t. It also reflects the
proportion of individuals in the population that will have
a survival time longer than t. We use the Kaplan–Meier
(KM) estimator, a non-parametric survival analysis
technique, to construct survival functions for firms. Then,
we use the Cox proportional hazards model to test the
impact of explanatory variables on Internet firm survival.
We also use a calendar time-based semiparametric sur-
vival analysis, so we can control for the impact of
market conditions.8 The strength of this multi-method
approach is that it allows us to visually construct a curve
that depicts the survival patterns for Internet firms and
then examine what drives observed Internet firm bank-
ruptcy and survival.
7 Non-parametric survival analysis does not involve any assumption
about the functional form of the hazard function. In contrast,
semiparametric survival analysis places restrictions and assumptions
on the functional forms of portions of the hazard function. In addition,
parametric survival analysis permits an analyst to fully specify the
functional forms of the hazard and survival functions, which may
depend on either a set of covariates or time, or both. Typical models
that are used include the Weibull and exponential models. Other
models that can be used to specify statistical distributions for the
hazard include the log-logistic, log-normal, and gamma distributions.
For additional details on the rationale for using these different
models, the interested reader should see Le [35], Hosmer and
Lemeshow [25], and Lawless [33].
8 In age-based analysis, we compare firms at the same age, that is,
the same number of quarters after IPO. Performing age-based
comparison allows us to eliminate the impact on the hazard rate
and survival of the learning effect associated with firm age. In
calendar time-based analysis, we compare Internet firm survival on a
calendar quarter-by-calendar quarter basis. This way, we can compare
the survival and failure outcome of all firms that were at the risk of
failure during a specific calendar quarter. Performing a calendar time-
based analysis allows us to eliminate the confounding effects of
environmental factors on firm survival. This is especially important
for our research since our sample period includes periods of ‘‘boom
and bust’’ for the Internet firms.
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3.2 The KM estimator
The KM estimator calculates the survival function at age t
using S^t ¼
Q
tðqÞ t
ntðqÞdtðqÞ
ntðqÞ
(q = 1,..., Q) [35], where Q is
the number of distinct event times, t(q) is the time (for the
number of quarters after the IPO occurs) of a bankruptcy,
liquidation, merger, or acquisition, and nt(q) is the number
of firms still in operation up until time t(q) and still at risk
at time t(q). dt(q) is the number of firms that has the event of
interest at time t(q). From the formula, we can see that the
survival function is calculated as a product of the survival
ratios not only at time t, but also at earlier times when the
event was observed for some individuals. As a result, the
KM estimator allows us to take into account the survival
history of all firms when calculating the survival function
at a specific time. Survival rates at different times can be
plotted against firm duration, resulting in KM curves.
3.3 The Cox proportional hazards model
The Cox proportional hazards model assumes that a firm’s
hazard rate at time t has a non-parametric baseline hazard
h0(t) that is dependent on t, and a parametric part (with bs)
that reflects the impact of firm and market variables on the
hazard rate. Together, this model is represented by the
following: hðt; x; bÞ ¼ h0ðtÞ expðb0xÞ: The independent
variables x change over time and also differ across firms.
Based on the hazard function, the cumulative baseline
hazard function [35] is H0 tð Þ ¼
R t
0
h0ðyÞdy: The partial
likelihood function is PLðbÞ ¼ QIi¼1 expðb
0xi;tðiÞÞP
j2RðtðiÞÞ expðb
0xj;tðiÞÞ
 ci
;
where I represents the sample size and each firm is denoted
by i [25]. The notation t(i) refers to firm i’s duration up to
its exit. R(t(i)) is the risk set, the set of firms that are at risk
of failing at t(i), when we observe firm i’s exit. R(t(i))
includes all firms with durations equal to or longer than
firm i’s duration. The vector of independent variables for
firm i at the time of its exit is xi,t(i), and the vector of time-
varying covariates for firm j that is at risk of exit is xj,t(i).
The variable ci is a censoring indicator, with the value 0 if
the observation i is censored, and 1 otherwise. When we
calculate the ratio of firm i’s hazard rate over the sum of
the hazard rates of all firms in the risk set, the baseline
hazard cancels out.9
4 Sample, variables, and econometric models
We next explain our data collection procedure and the
unique qualities of our data set for this kind of research.
We also provide descriptive statistics on our sample. We
then discuss the definitions of our model variables in order
to reveal to the reader the variety of choices we faced to
effectively specify an empirical model. We further discuss
some of the estimation issues that arise as a result of our
instantiation of the variables. Finally, we present the
econometric models we use to estimate the parameters, and
discuss the reasons why we believe they will be able to
effectively capture the theorized effects that we wish to
explore.
4.1 Sample
We define an Internet firm in parallel with Barua et al.
[10]: a dotcom firm generates all of its revenues though the
Internet. They set the cutoff point at 95% of revenues,
recognizing that Internet firms receive revenues though
traditional channels such as phone or fax. We use 90% as
the cutoff and include well-known public Internet firms.10
Our data cover the second quarter of 1996 to the second
quarter of 2006; financial data for private firms were
unavailable during this period. We also eliminated firms
that went public as traditional firms and later became
Internet firms. Their success ought to be explained some-
what differently than for firms founded as Internet firms,
and modeled somewhat differently as a result too. Our data
come from multiple sources: COMPUSTAT, Mergent
Online, corporate filings with the SEC, and the EDGAR
Online IPO Express database. We eliminated firms with
revenues allocated between the channels, when information
on relative portions was missing. Our final main sample
consists of 130 publicly traded Internet firms. We coded the
independent variables based on these companies’ business
descriptions. We report our sample descriptive statistics for
the numbers of IPOs, bankruptcies, mergers, acquisitions,
and the total firms in Table 1.
4.2 Variables
We analyze two sets of models that provide triangulating
evidence for the various hypotheses that we wish to test.
Table 2 summarizes the variables.
9 There is no need for an intercept because the baseline hazard
absorbs all the variations in the hazard rate that are the same for all
firms at the same age. The PL function we present assumes no tied
durations. That is, no two firms exited at the same duration after IPO.
Adjustments to the PL function can be made to account for the
conjoint probability of observing two or more events at the same
duration. Our empirical results reflect this adjustment.
10 We admitted Barua et al.’s [8, 9] Layers 3 and 4 firms in our
sample. Layer 3 firms are e-intermediaries that provide e-markets to
facilitate buyers and sellers to meet and conduct transactions. Layer 4
firms are e-commerce firms that engage in online selling of products
or services. See Appendix 1 for a list of firms in our data set.
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4.2.1 Dependent variables
There are two dependent variables in our model. Duration
is defined the same in the two sets of models as the number
of quarters elapsed from the time an Internet firm issued an
IPO until the time of its bankruptcy or bankruptcy pro-
tection filing, liquidation, the termination of the Internet-
related business, merger, acquisition, or the end of the
study period, if the firm was still operating. Status is a
binary censoring indicator and is defined differently in each
model. In the first model, we examine the impact of our
explanatory variables on bankruptcies and liquidations.
The binary indicator, Status, is 1 if a firm went bankrupt,
filed for bankruptcy protection, was liquidated, or termi-
nated its Internet-related business, and 0 otherwise. Some
firms in our data set experienced mergers and acquisitions
(M&As). Although bankruptcies and liquidations generally
can be viewed as failures, M&As are sometimes the
Table 1 Summary statistics for
IPO and exit years
Year No. of
IPOs
No. of
bankruptcies
No. of
mergers
No. of
acquisitions
No. of
firms
1996 6 0 0 0 6
1997 10 0 0 0 16
1998 10 0 0 0 26
1999 62 0 4 2 82
2000 23 3 6 5 91
2001 0 7 8 16 60
2002 1 7 4 3 47
2003 3 6 3 1 40
2004 10 0 4 2 44
2005 5 2 0 3 44
2006 – 0 2 0 42
Total 130 25 31 32 –
Table 2 Definitions of model variables
Variable Definition
Dependent variables
Status Model 1 (bankruptcy/liquidation): 1 if bankrupt/filed bankruptcy protection/liquidated/ terminated Internet-related
business, else 0
Model 2 (failure): 1 if bankrupt/ filed bankruptcy protection/liquidated/ terminated Internet-related business, or M&A
preceded by declining sales; else 0
Duration Number quarters from IPO to bankruptcy or bankruptcy protection filing, liquidation, termination of Internet-related
business, M&A, or study period end, whichever is sooner
Independent variables—main effects
InteractionPlatform 1 if the firm’s business model is mainly to serve as a platform that connects individuals to one another for interaction
and transactions, and consumers and businesses for B2C and B2B interactions and transactions with each other; and
0 otherwise
NewNetBusMod 1 if the firm’s business model is new based on what the technological innovations associated with the Internet make
possible; 0 otherwise
DigitalGoods 3 if the firm provides digital products or services; 2 if the firm sells non-perishable physical products; 1 if the firm sells
perishable physical products
TransBrokerBusMod 1 if the firm’s business model is as a transaction broker; 0 otherwise
AdvtBusMod 1 if the firm’s majority of revenues are from advertising; 0 otherwise
Independent variables—controls
Competition Number of competing public Internet firms
FinCapital The firm’s financial capital in millions of inflation-adjusted 1982 dollars
ln(Employee) The natural logarithm of the number of employees
ln(NASDAQ) The natural logarithm of the NASDAQ composite index
Note: There are no cases in which the value of DigitalGoods is equal to 0
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desirable strategic choice of a firm’s management. Hence
M&As cannot all be treated as failures. In model 2, we
examine the different causes of M&As and view declining
sales prior to a merger or an acquisition as an indictor of
failure, and treat the others as survival cases. In this model,
the binary indicator, Status, is 1 if a firm went bankrupt,
filed for bankruptcy protection, was liquidated, terminated
its Internet-related business, or had a merger or acquisition
preceded by a 20% or more sales decline compared to the
same quarter a year earlier, and otherwise 0.
4.2.2 Independent variables
Based on our hypotheses, we have five independent vari-
ables: InteractionPlatform, NewNetBusMod, DigitalGoods,
TransBrokerBusMod, and AdvtBusMod. InteractionPlat-
form is 1 if an Internet firm’s business model mainly aims
at connecting individuals and businesses so as to allow
them to interact with each other. Online auction sites,
online communities, B2B marketplaces, and online career
Web sites are examples; otherwise InteractionPlatform is
0. NewNetBusMod is 1 if an Internet firm employs a new
business model which exists only on the Internet; otherwise
NewNetBusMod is 0. Examples are search engines, online
portals, and Internet domain registrars. DigitalGoods is an
ordinal variable which measures the degree to which an
Internet firm’s products and services are suitable for
Internet-based selling, using three categories.11 Trans-
BrokerBusMod is 1 if a company employs the transaction
broker business model, and 0 otherwise. Examples include
online travel agencies, stock brokerage firms, insurance
agencies, medical claim processing firms, etc. Finally,
AdvtBusMod is 1 if the majority of a firm’s revenue is from
advertising on its Web site, and 0 otherwise.12
4.2.3 Control variables
Previous research on business survival suggests that factors
such as competition, firm size, financial capital, and the
condition of the market and economy are important
determinants of survival [5, 23, 24, 31]. We include them
as control variables in our models, for this reason. Based on
the business descriptions of our sample Internet firms, we
identified 35 different market sectors in which they oper-
ated and measure competition based on the number of
publicly traded Internet firms in the same sector. We do not
use the number of business establishments by the North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) because
this does not accurately capture the extent of competition
in the digital marketplace. For example, different Internet
firms such as online portals, online auction houses, content
sites, and online career sites are all categorized as ‘‘com-
puter programming and data processing firms’’ (NAICS
518111).13 We control for firm size measured by ln(Em-
ployee), the natural logarithm of the number of firm
employees. FinCapital representing the firm’s financial
capital is measured as the firm’s assets minus its liabilities
in millions of U.S. dollars. We adjusted FinCapital to 1982
dollars using the Producer Price Index. To control for
financial market conditions, we also include the natural
logarithm of the NASDAQ composite index, ln(NASDAQ),
as a control variable in the analysis of our empirical
models.
4.3 Estimation forms of the empirical models
One important assumption of the Cox regression is that as
the covariates change, their impacts on the hazard rate
change proportionally. Testing using scaled Schoenfeld
residuals [21] suggested that InteractionPlatform and
ln(Employee) violate this assumption at the .05 level. So
we added the interaction terms between each variable and
the natural logarithm of time t to examine how the impact
of these variables change as a firm matures.14 We use fixed
values for our five explanatory variables to predict Internet
firm survival. We analyze the process by which the inde-
pendent variables vary across firms over time and how that
affects survivability.
Based on the above definitions of our model variables
and after applying appropriate lags for the independent and
11 We assessed a couple of different coding approaches for the
underlying construct here. One approach that we evaluated was to use
two variables, PerishableProduct and Non-PerishableProduct. The
variables represent perishable physical products (1,0) and non-
perishable physical products (0,1) as the alternative cases, with
digital products as the base case when the variables are (0,0). We
settled on coding DigitalGoods in continuous categorical form, as
follows: 3 if the company provides digital products or services that
can be directly presented or downloaded via the Internet; 2 if the
company sells non-perishable physical products that have to be
physically delivered to the customers; and 1 if the company sells
perishable products such as groceries, flowers, and plants that have
limited delivery radius or high delivery costs. The results of the
models which we present later in the article were essentially the same
for both codings, so we chose to present the leanest, one-variable
version [28].
12 The two authors independently coded each Internet firm in our
sample for values of the independent variables. We then discussed our
differences until we reached consensus. The inter-coder consistencies
were 90, 99, 100, and 98% for InteractionPlatform, NewNetBusMod,
DigitalGoods, and TransBrokerBusMod, respectively.
13 Many online retailers are categorized as ‘‘catalog and mail-order
houses’’ with the exception of Barnes and Noble.com (www.bn.com),
which is categorized as a ‘‘miscellaneous shopping goods store.’’
14 It is standard in survival analysis to add time-dependent variables
to correct for violations of the proportionality assumption [3, 4, 13,
29]. This is usually done by adding an interaction term between a
variable with time or the logarithm or natural logarithm of time. We
chose to do this with the latter specification of the variables.
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control variables, the Cox proportional hazards model on
the hazard rate of firm i at quarter t after its IPO is:
hði;tÞ¼h0ðtÞexp½b1InteractionPlatformi
þb2NewNetBusModiþb3 DigitalGoodsi
þ b4 TransBrokerBusModi
þb5 AdvtBusModi
þb6 Competitioni;t1þb7 FinCapitali;t2
þ b8 lnðEmployeei;t1 Þ
þb9 lnðNASDAQi;t1Þ
þb10 InteractionPlatformi  lnðTimeÞ
þ b11 lnðEmployeei;t1 Þ  lnðTimeÞ ð1Þ
Note that we use one-quarter-lagged data for ln(Employee)
and ln(NASDAQ). We use two-quarter-lagged FinCapital,
however, because financial data for the quarter immediately
before firm bankruptcy or liquidation are usually not available.
In addition to performing an age-based analysis where we
compare Internet firm survival based on firm age since IPO,
we also perform a calendar time-based analysis following
Honjo [24]. Calendar time-based analysis allows us to
examine the impacts of our explanatory variables on firm
survival based on calendar time and eliminate the confound-
ing impact of temporal market effects. This is especially
helpful since our sample Internet firms went through a unique
period characterized first by market hype and then by a sharp
downturn in their prospects. We are also able to cross-check
our results from the age-based and calendar time-based
analyses. In the calendar time-based analysis, we omit the
variable ln(NASDAQ) since the NASDAQ composite index is
always the same in the same quarter. We add two new vari-
ables, AgeSinceIPO and (AgeSinceIPO)2, to control for the
impact of firm age on survival.
~hðt;iÞ¼ ~h0ðtÞexp½~b1InteractionPlatformi
þ~b2NewNetBusModiþ~b3DigitalGoodsi
þ~b4TransBrokerBusModi
þ~b5AdvtBusModiþ~b6Competitioni;t1
þ~b7FinCapitali;t2 þ~b8 ln(Employeei;t1)
þ~b10 InteractionPlatformi  lnðTimeÞ
þ~b11 lnðEmployeei;t1Þ  lnðTimeÞ
þ ~b12AgeSinceIPOi;t
þ~b13ðAgeSinceIPOi;t Þ2] ð2Þ
4.3.1 Econometric issues
We report the descriptive statistics for our variables in
Table 3. Table 4 displays appropriately lagged correlation
matrix for the variables. Because the number of employees
is reported annually, values for ln(Employee) are the same
for the four quarters in the same year. No two variables
have a correlation higher than .60.
4.3.2 Endogeneity
In our empirical models, the independent variables represent
choices that most Internet firms in our sample made when they
were established. There may be an endogeneity issue though:
firms with smarter management teams may have chosen to
employ business models more suited for the digital channel.
As a result, firms that made these decisions are more likely to
survive because of their better management. We believe this is
not a major concern in our analysis for two reasons. First, firms
typically choose their primary market, product and service
offerings, and the industry they want to compete in prior to
deciding to launch a stock IPO. Our sample began with firms’
IPOs, a time by which the firms’ product and industry choices
should have been established. Second, the market hype for
Internet firms with different business models in the late 1990s
was equally high as reflected by the press coverage and the
amount of funding many Internet firms received. Though
many firms failed later, they were perceived as equally inno-
vative and had promising business models at the time of their
founding and IPOs.
5 Results
We first report our non-parametric survival analysis results.
Then we discuss the semiparametric Cox proportional
hazards model analysis results.
5.1 Results from the KM curve analysis
Non-parametric survival analysis involves plotting KM
curves for the sample. Due to space constraints, we only show
the KM curves with firm failure as the event. Failure here
means a bankruptcy, liquidation, termination of Internet-
related business model, or merger or acquisition proceeded by
declining sales of 20% or more compared with the same
quarter in the prior year. We first report the KM curve for our
130 sample firms, then we compare the KM curves for sub-
groups of firms based on the five explanatory variables.
The KM curve aggregates all 130 firms in Fig. 1. The
curve reveals that the majority of the failures for Internet
firms occurred between Quarters (Qtr) 6 and 24 in their
lifetimes. The period between Years 1 and 6 after an
Internet firm has gone public is critical to its long-term
survival. The plateau in the KM curve suggests that no
bankruptcy or failure outcomes occurred after Qtr 24.
During the first year after its IPO, a firm is able to use the
funds it obtained to continue its operations. So we see a
low failure rate. Thereafter, however, firms become more
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susceptible to negative operational outcomes and market
turbulence, which is consistent with the higher failure rate
in the KM curve. KM curves also allow us to plot the
survival pattern, even though they do not pinpoint the
causes of failure. Since most of the Internet firms in our
sample issued IPOs in 1999 and 2000, the effect of the high
failure rate after Year 1 may be due to the tough market
environment that has ensued since March 2000. The higher
likelihood of survival after Year 6 suggests that more
established public Internet firms may have had more time
to build up their resources to buck the Internet firm market
decline.
We next plot the KM curves for subgroup comparisons
based on our five explanatory variables in Fig. 2a–e. From
Fig. 2a, we see that public Internet firms that connected
individuals and businesses via the digital channel and
served as interaction platforms achieved higher survival
rates soon after their IPOs. However, after Year 3, the trend
reversed and Internet firms that served as interaction plat-
forms for individuals and businesses started to have a lower
survival rate than that of the other group.
One possible explanation is that the market perceived
Internet firms which connected individuals and businesses
as having business models that were better suited to the
digital channel early on, making them more likely to
survive right from the start. The installed base of customers
was extremely important for these companies, however,
and not all were so resistant to failure. As the competition
intensified, firms that failed to attract Internet traffic faced
increasing survival pressure and had to exit the
marketplace.
Table 4 Correlation matrix (130 firms, 1,641 observations)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 InteractionPlatform 1.00 0.24*** 0.30*** -0.08*** 0.15*** -0.20*** 0.14*** 0.17*** -0.06**
2 NewNetBusMod – 1.00 0.20*** -0.20*** 0.42*** 0.01 0.15*** 0.06** -0.08***
3 DigitalGoods – – 1.00 0.22*** 0.31*** -0.47*** 0.12*** -0.12*** -0.10***
4 TransBrokerBusMod – – – 1.00 -0.32*** -0.33*** 0.06** 0.09*** -0.06**
5 AdvtBusMod – – – – 1.00 0.04* 0.06** -0.03 -0.01
6 Competition – – – – – 1.00 -0.10*** 0.02 0.32***
7 FinCapital – – – – – – 1.00 0.43*** 0.00
8 ln(Employee) – – – – – – – 1.00 -0.01
9 ln(NASDAQ) – – – – – – – – 1.00
Note: The correlations involve appropriately lagged variables
Significance: * p \ 0.10; ** p \ 0.05; *** p \ 0.01
Fig. 1 The KM curve for our sample of publicly traded Internet firms
(130 firms). Note: Circles on the curves indicate censored observa-
tions. Firm duration begins with the IPO of its stock, which is the start
of the stochastic failure process
Table 3 Descriptive statistics
(130 firms, 1,641 observations)
Variable Mean SD Min Max
InteractionPlatform (0/1) .30 .46 0 1
NewNetBusMod (0/1) .16 .37 0 1
DigitalGoods (1/2/3) 2.79 .45 1 3
TransBrokerBusMod (0/1) .18 .39 0 1
AdvtBusMod (0/1) .30 .46 0 1
Competition (number of competing firms) 5.54 4.90 0 21
FinCapital (in millions of dollars) 189.34 663.12 -1,130 6,195
ln(Employee) 5.36 1.40 0 9.44
ln(NASDAQ) 7.70 .36 7.07 8.43
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Figure 2b is the KM curve comparison based on whe-
ther a public Internet firm used a new business model that
emerged due to the Internet. The results show that, overall,
our sample of public Internet firms with new business
models had higher survival rates than those without, even
though the final survival fraction of the former was lower.
These results suggest that, possibly due to the better match
of the characteristics of their business models with the
Internet, firms with new business models had lower sur-
vival pressure up to Year 6 after their IPOs. However, since
most of these companies are search engines and online
portals and there was significant consolidation in these
marketplaces as firms grew larger, they experienced a
higher likelihood of failure after Year 6.
The KM curves in Fig. 2c for the three subgroups of
companies based on the suitability of their products and
services for Internet-based selling show that the more well-
suited a firm’s products are for sale via the digital channel,
the higher its survival likelihood. Figure 2d shows that
public Internet firms that were transaction brokers enjoyed
higher survival rates, possibly due to their lower
operational costs and the lower prices they were able to
provide to their customers.
Public Internet firms that relied primarily on advertising
for their revenues had higher survival rates compared with
others, as shown in Fig. 2e. This reveals the advertising
industry’s recognition of the value of Internet-based
advertising.
Even though our KM curve comparisons allow us to
visually examine the survival patterns of Internet firms with
different characteristics and business models, the results are
not conclusive: we are only examining their survival along
one single dimension. To address this shortcoming, we next
will perform an age-based analysis and a calendar time-
based analysis using the Cox proportional hazards model.
This will permit us to further investigate how these factors
simultaneously affect Internet firm survival.
5.2 Results from the Cox proportional hazards model
To gauge the impacts of various drivers on firm survival,
we now present the age-based results of a Cox proportional
Fig. 2 (a) KM curves for
InteractionPlatform. (b) KM
curves for NewNetBusMod. (c)
KM curves for DigitalGoods.
(d) KM curves for
TransBrokerBusMod. (e) KM
curves by AdvtBusMod
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hazard model in Table 5. Here we distinguish between the
hazard ratio (HR), a statistic that is similar to the marginal
effects on failure in the logit model, and the hazard rate,
the instantaneous failure rate at time t assuming a firm is
still at risk up until that time. The HR depicts the marginal
impact of a one-unit increase of an explanatory variable on
the hazard rate. The HR is written as exp(bi), where bi is
the estimated coefficient for an explanatory variable xi.
Overall, our models have likelihood ratio statistics of 36.3
and 35.1, and are both significant at the .01 level.
The results show that the predictors of bankruptcies and
failures are similar but not identical. In model 1, significant
variables include InteractionPlatform, TransBrokerBus-
Mod, AdvtBusMod, InteractionPlatform  ln(Time),
ln(Employee), and ln(Employee)  ln(Time).15 The coeffi-
cient estimate for InteractionPlatform is negative and
significant with a HR smaller than one (b1 = -13.186,
p \ .01, HR = 2e-6). The HR shows that the hazard rate
of a public Internet firm that served as interaction platforms
for individuals and businesses was only .0002% of that of a
firm that did not provide such platforms, ceteris paribus.
This suggests that the Interaction Platform Hypothesis (H1)
is supported. In addition, the interaction term between
InteractionPlatform and the natural logarithm of time t is
also significant with a positive parameter and a larger than
one HR (b10 = 5.380, p \ .01, HR = 217.057). These
results suggest that as our sample Internet firms matured
and the stronger ones were left after the weaker ones either
went bankrupt or liquidated, the impact of Interaction-
Platform on survival diminished.
The parameter estimate for TransBrokerBusMod is sig-
nificant and negative with a smaller than one HR (b4 =
-2.191, p \ .05, HR = .112). The HR statistic indicates
that the hazard rate of a public Internet firm that was a
transaction broker was 11.2% of that of another firm. Thus,
the Transaction Broker Hypothesis (H4) also is supported.
AdvtBusMod is weakly significant with a negative param-
eter estimate and a smaller than one HR (b5 = -.969,
p \ .10, HR = .379). These results suggest that, for public
Internet firms that relied mainly on advertising as their
source of revenues, their hazard rate of going bankrupt or
being liquidated was only 37.9% of other firms that had
other primary revenue streams. Thus, we see that the
Advertising as Main-Source-of-Revenue Hypothesis (H5)
is supported too.
ln(Employee) has a positive and significant parameter
estimate with a larger than one HR in model 1
(b8 = 4.264, p \ .01, HR = 71.124). The HR suggests
that when the natural logarithm of a public Internet
firm’s number of employees increased by one, its hazard
Table 5 Cox model results for age-based analysis
Variable Model 1: bankruptcies and liquidations
(25 events)
Model 2: bankruptcies, liquidations, and
M&A’s with declining sales (37 events)
Coeff (SD) Hazard ratio Coeff (SD) Hazard ratio
InteractionPlatform (b1) -13.186
*** (4.777) 0.000 -9.018*** (3.012) 0.000
NewNetBusMod (b2) -0.091 (0.674) 0.913 -0.383 (0.548) 0.682
DigitalGoods (b3) 0.193 (0.525) 1.213 0.196 (0.456) 1.217
TransBrokerBusMod (b4) -2.191
** (1.084) 0.112 -1.584** (0.783) 0.205
AdvtBusMod (b5) -0.969
* (0.597) 0.379 -0.365 (0.435) 0.694
Competition (b6) 0.031 (0.043) 1.032 0.049 (0.037) 1.050
FinCapital (b7) -0.002 (0.002) 0.998 -0.003 (0.002) 0.997
ln(Employee) (b8) 4.264
*** (1.355) 71.124 3.652*** (1.132) 38.569
ln(NASDAQ) (b9) -0.393 (0.808) 0.675 -0.897 (0.690) 0.408
InteractionPlatform  ln(Time) (b10) 5.380*** (1.826) 217.057 3.884*** (1.206) 48.599
ln(Empl)  ln(Time) (b11) -1.786*** (0.549) 0.168 -1.499*** (0.456) 0.223
Likelihood ratio statistic 36.3, 11 df, p \ 0.01 35.1, 11 df, p \ 0.01
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Estimation without an intercept, so b0 is omitted
Time period covered is second Qtr 1996 to second Qtr 2006
Significance * p \ 0.10; ** p \ 0.05; *** p \ 0.01
15 We observed large coefficient estimates for a few of our variables,
including InteractionPlatform, ln(Employee), and InteractionPlat-
formln(Time). This was mainly due to the inclusion of
InteractionPlatform, ln(Employee), as well as their interaction terms
with ln(Time) together in the same model. When we only included
InteractionPlatform and ln(Employee) without the interaction terms,
the coefficients were much smaller. However, the model violated the
proportional hazards assumption. When we added the interaction
terms, the coefficients for each variable and its corresponding
interaction term with ln(Time) had opposite signs and became much
larger. This is due to these coefficients picking up changes in the
impacts of these variables over time as firms grew.
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rate due to bankruptcy or liquidation increased to about
71 times its original value. The interaction term between
ln(Employee) and ln(Time) is significant with a negative
parameter estimate and a smaller than one HR (b11 = -
1.786, p \ .01, HR = .168). This reveals that although
firm size had a negative impact on survival right after a
firm’s IPO, this impact diminished over time. No other
variable was significant in model 1. We conclude from
these findings that the New Internet-Only Business
Model Hypothesis (H2) and the Digital Goods Hypoth-
esis (H3) were not supported.
In model 2 where we examine the impact of the
explanatory variables on firm failure, the significant vari-
ables are InteractionPlatform, TransBrokerBusMod,
ln(Employee), InteractionPlatform  ln(Time), and ln(Em-
ployee)  ln(Time). The signs of InteractionPlatform and
InteractionPlatform  ln(Time) in model 2 are similar to
those in model 1, indicating that our sample public Internet
firms that served as interaction platforms for individuals
and businesses online and allowed them to interact with
each other enjoyed lower hazard rates of failure, even
though the difference diminished over time as firms
matured. Again, we see evidence that the Interaction
Platform Hypothesis (H1) should be accepted. TransBrok-
erBusMod had a negative parameter estimate and smaller
than one HR, indicating that Internet firms in our sample
that were transaction brokers experienced a lower likeli-
hood of failure compared with other firms. Thus, we assert
that the Transaction Broker Hypothesis (H4) also is sup-
ported in this instance. Similar to the results in Model 1,
ln(Employee) and ln(Employee)  ln(Time) were both sig-
nificant with positive and negative signs, respectively.
Hence, our sample of public Internet firms first experienced
decreased likelihood of survival as their sizes increased,
but then as they grew and competition intensified, the
larger ones started to gain survival advantage. No other
variables are significant though. From this, we conclude
that the New Internet-Only Business Model Hypothesis
(H2), the Digital Goods Hypothesis (H3), and the Adver-
tising as Main-Source-of-Revenue Hypothesis (H5) do not
appear to be supported for the data set that we evaluated
related to the prediction of Internet failures.
We summarize our hypothesis testing results in Table 6.
The Interaction Platform Hypothesis (H1) and the Trans-
action Broker Hypothesis (H4) were supported by results
from both models, while the Advertising as Main-Source-
of-Revenue was only partially supported in the prediction
of bankruptcies and liquidations. These results suggest that
although Internet firms which relied primarily on adver-
tising as their revenue source experienced a lower
probability of bankruptcy and liquidation during our sam-
ple period, they were equally likely to fail compared with
other firms, when the possibility of an M&A due to
declining sales is also taken into consideration. The New
Internet-Only Business Model Hypothesis (H2) and Digital
Goods Hypothesis (H3) were not supported by the results
from either of our models though, indicating that these
factors were not important dimensions affecting public
Internet firm survival.
Because of the dramatic change in market conditions
during our sample period, it is possible that ln(NASDAQ)
itself is not able to completely capture the impact of the
market and the macroeconomy. To explore this, we
performed a calendar time-based semiparametric survival
analysis. We compared Internet firm hazard rates during
the same calendar quarter. This approach allowed us to
tease out the impacts of the macroeconomic environment
and investor psychology during different periods, and
permitted us to focus on the firm and e-commerce
related drivers of survival. We eliminated ln(NASDAQ)
since there was no variation in this time-specific variable
across firms in the same calendar quarter. We also added
AgeSinceIPO and AgeSinceIPO2 to capture their separate
effects on survival. We obtained similar results to the
age-based survival analysis in terms of both the param-
eter estimates and their significance levels for
InteractionPlatform, TransBrokerBusMod, AdvtBusMod,
ln(Employee), and the interaction terms between Inter-
actionPlatform and ln(Employee) with ln(Time). These
results strengthen the support that is provided by our
Internet firm age-based analysis.16
6 Discussion
Our analysis of the drivers of Internet firm survival has five
major findings. First, the plateaus in the KM curves give a
visual representation of the survival patterns and show that
after surviving the initial competition, an Internet firm
faced a reduced risk of failure. This selection process
started one year after IPO issuance and continued for
another five years. Second, our age- and calendar time-
based Cox proportional hazards model results are consis-
tent and suggest that the suitability of the characteristics of
an Internet firm’s business model for the digital channel
does indeed affect survival. The important dimensions
include whether a company: (1) is able to take advantage of
the global interactivity the Internet offers to serve as
16 AgeSinceIPO was significant with positive parameter estimates
and greater than one HRs in both models. AgeSinceIPO2 was
significant with a negative parameter estimate and smaller than one
HR in both models. These results suggest that our sample Internet
firms’ likelihood due to failure first increased with age, then it
decreased as the weaker ones exited the market and the more
successful ones were left.
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interaction platforms for individuals and businesses; (2)
facilitates online transactions; and (3) relies on advertising
as the primary source of revenue.
No other medium can match the Internet’s capabilities
in connecting millions of individuals and businesses across
the world and allowing them to provide user-generated
content and interact with each other. When an Internet firm
takes advantage of the opportunity to serve as an interac-
tion platform, it is well suited to the digital channel and
benefits from a higher likelihood of survival early on. As
the installed base of customers is extremely important for
these companies, however, the competition among them
intensifies quickly. As a result, the firms face increasingly
higher pressure for survival in the midst of market
consolidation.
Another finding is that Internet companies which act as
transaction brokers were less likely to go bankrupt or be
liquidated. The digital channel allows customers to serve
themselves and enable businesses to automate and digitize
many of their business processes. This leads to increased
customer satisfaction and loyalty, as well as reduced
operational costs for the companies. Interestingly, our
results show that Internet firms which relied primarily on
advertising as their revenue source were less likely to go
bankrupt or be liquidated. As we mentioned earlier, the
Internet is an attractive advertising medium due to the ease
of implementing customized and targeted advertising. On
the other hand, Internet firms primarily relying on adver-
tising as their revenues have been vulnerable to fluctuations
in corporate advertising expenditures. Our results never-
theless show that the benefits of online advertising are
valuable.
Third, our results also revealed the dynamics of how the
impact on firm survival of serving as an interaction plat-
form and firm size changed over time as an Internet firm
matured. There are three possible explanations for the
diminishing impact of these variables. First, as an Internet
firm grew and matured, it was more likely to withstand the
survival pressure coming from factors such as less-than-
best match with the digital channel and tough market
conditions. Second, as the weaker Internet firms went
bankrupt or failed, only the more successful ones were left.
These stronger firms were able to cope better with the
disadvantageous position of operating in competitive
markets or tough financial market conditions. Third, as the
Internet sector grew, firms may have started to compete
among themselves based on size, resulting in the dimin-
ished impact of factors such as whether a firm offered an
Internet-based interaction platform.
Our research also contributes to the organizational
ecology and evolution literature in identifying aspects of
an Internet firm’s business model’s match with the dig-
ital channel that affects survival. These include taking
advantage of the capabilities that the Internet offers as an
interaction platform for individuals and businesses, and
being a transaction broker to reduce transaction costs in
the digital channel. Examples of the first include online
auctions that connect buyers and sellers and online
communities that allow people from around the world to
share their opinions and interests with each other.
Examples of transaction brokers include online travel
agencies and security brokerage firms. In addition, the
organizational ecology and evolution literature also point
out directions of future research. For example, the
organizational evolution literature examines the variation,
selection, and retention cycle firms go through. Future
research can examine how Internet business models
evolve over time through this cycle and reveal the
dynamics in the process that has led to the observed
successes and failures.
7 Conclusion
We developed and tested an empirical model of Internet
firm duration to extend our knowledge of IT firm
Table 6 Hypothesis testing results
Hypothesis Model 1: bankruptcies
and liquidations
Model 2: bankruptcies, liquidations,
and M&A’s with declining sales
Supported
(Yes/No)
H1: The Interaction Platform Hypothesis - - Yes
H2: The New Internet-Only Business Model Hypothesis Not significant Not significant No
H3: The Digital Goods Hypothesis Not significant Not significant No
H4: The Transaction Broker Hypothesis - - Yes
H5: The Advertising as Main-Source-of-Revenue Hypothesis - Not significant Partially
Note: Minus signs represent the marginal effects of the variables on the hazard rate
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performance and survival. By identifying unique charac-
teristics of the digital channel, we were able to examine
how the extent to which the related characteristics of an
Internet firm’s business model were well suited to the
Internet, and affected its survival. We performed non-
parametric and semiparametric survival analyses on a
sample of public Internet firms. Our most interesting results
suggest that Internet firms that served as interaction plat-
forms for individuals and businesses, facilitated online
transactions, and relied on advertising as the primary rev-
enue source were more likely to survive. Large firm size,
we found, was also associated with a higher likelihood of
bankruptcy or liquidation among Internet firms. Our results
also reveal the dynamics of the impacts of firm size and
being an interaction platform, and that an Internet firm’s
survival was less affected by these factors as the business
grew and matured.
Our research has some limitations. First, Internet firms
are relatively young, so our results may not characterize
the ways they survive or fail once they mature (e.g., 15–
20 years from their establishment). Our sample period
from early 1996 to early 2006 was a time that was
characterized by some ‘‘irrational exuberance,’’ as past
U.S. Federal Reserve Bank chairman, Alan Greenspan,
has noted. This restricts the generalizability of our
results. Still, this study increases our understanding of
the turbulent digital marketplace. Managers can learn
about the drivers for survival, and address the most
crucial ones to maintain a healthy Internet business.
Although the impact of factors such as the NASDAQ
Composite Index may be affected by the unique quality
of the market during this period, other variables (e.g., a
firm’s capacity to provide an Internet-based interaction
platform, business model unique to the Internet, and
being a transaction broker) are likely to be important at
other times too.
Second, our results may not generalize to private
Internet firms. Most private dotcoms are still in their
early stages of development and have been less suc-
cessful. They more often incurred high setup costs and
had to work to establish steady revenue streams. During
the Internet boom, venture capital backing was the most
important factor influencing their survival. Thus, sys-
tematic differences between private and public Internet
firms may be present, but our results nevertheless sug-
gest that there are business model characteristics
affecting survival which should still apply to private
firms.
Third, due to our limited sample size or unavailable
data, we were not able to include all of the variables that
might affect survival. PLC theory suggests that a firm’s
efficiency relative to the industry’s minimum efficient
scale size affects its survival [1]. We were unable to
obtain scale size data, which do not yet exist for Internet
firms. Another consideration is business model quality
[27]. The e-grocer, Webvan, used an unsuccessful busi-
ness model, which spotlighted its leaders’ apparent poor
business vision and faulty management practices. These
played important roles in its demise. The quality of the
senior management team should be explored in future
research, along with these other considerations.
We hinted earlier that another limitation may arise in
the context of our econometric estimation of Internet
firm survival due to endogeneity [30]. Endogenous
variables ‘‘have outcome values determined through
joint interaction with other variables in the system ...
[and] affect the outcomes of the exogenous variables’’
[26, p. 564]. The choices that management makes (e.g.,
business model, product and focal industry to enter,
etc.) are likely to be jointly determined with the
dependent variable, the likelihood of survival for the
firm. Rational senior managers will deploy technology
to enter the most attractive market environments with
products and services that are likely to sell, based on
their research. This kind of problem arises in many
technology investment settings [19]. So we caution the
reader to interpret our results within the bounds of this
additional consideration.
Future research also should examine Internet firm sur-
vival using a larger sample size. Even though it is difficult
to obtain financial information about private firms,
researchers can perform small-scale analysis of the per-
formance of private Internet firms and then compare them
with public firms, and, in that way, shed more light on the
differences between them relative to survival.
Acknowledgments We are indebted to Paul Tallon and the
anonymous reviewers of this article at various stages along the way
for their helpful suggestions. We thank Indranil Bardhan, Alok
Gupta, Dennis Ahlburg, Sudipto Banerjee, Rajiv Banker, Alina
Chircu, Eric Clemons, Qizhi Dai, Gordon Davis, Rajiv Dewan,
Jungpil Hahn, Yuji Honjo, Bao-Jun Jiang, M.S. Krishnan, Zining
Li, Hank Lucas, Brian McCall, Chris Nachtsheim, Fred Riggins,
Pervin Shroff, Eric Walden and Chuck Wood for various critical
comments. We also benefited from the input of the participants of
the ‘‘Competitive Strategy, Economics, and Information Technol-
ogy’’ mini-track at HICSS, and the Workshop on Information
Systems and Economics. This work was also presented at the
University of Minnesota, the University of Michigan, Notre Dame
University, Michigan State University and the University of
Maryland, where seminar participants offered us ideas on the
theory, measurement and modeling issues. We thank Tim Miller,
previously CEO of Webmergers.com, for access to Internet firm
bankruptcy and shutdown data. Rob Kauffman thanks the MIS
Research Center at Minnesota and the Center for Advancing
Business through IT at Arizona State for partial support. Bin Wang
thanks the University of Minnesota Graduate School, the Carlson
School of Management, and the University of Texas-Pan American
for partial support. The usual disclaimers apply.
Inf Technol Manage (2008) 9:215–232 229
123
Appendix
Firms in Our Data Set
Company name Business description Company name Business description
About.com Internet portal El Sitio Internet portal
Amazon.com Online retailer E-Loan Online loan broker
AmeriTrade Holding Corp. Online stock brokerage Emerge Interactive Online B2B marketplace
Answers Corp. Content site Emusic.com Digital music/audio content
Aptimus Online direct marketer eToys Online retailer
Arbinet Thexchange Inc. Online B2B marketplace Excite Internet portal
ARTISTdirect Content site Expedia Online travel agency
Ashford.com Online retailer FactSet Research Systems Online informediary
Audible Digital music/audio content Fashionmall.com Internet portal
Audiohighway.com Digital music/audio content Fogdog Online retailer
Autobytel Online auto buying services FreeMarkets Online B2B marketplace
Autoweb.com Online auto buying services Garden.com Online retailer
Babyuniverse, Inc. Online retailer GeoCities Web hosting services
Baidu.com, Inc. Internet search engine GetThere.com Online travel agency
BN.com Online retailer GlobalNet Financial.com Content site
Beyond.com Corp. Online retailer Go2Net Internet portal
BigStar Entertainment Online retailer Google, Inc. Internet search engine
Bofi Holding, Inc. Online bank Headhunter.net Online recruiting site
Blue Nile, Inc. Online retailer HomeGrocer.com Online grocer
Broadcast.com Internet broadcasting/radio HomeStore.com Online informediary
Buy.com Online retailer HotJobs.com Online recruiting site
CareerBuilder Online recruiting site Housevalues, Inc. Online informediary
CDnow (New) Online retailer IasiaWorks ISP and web hosting service provider
Claimsnet.com Online healthcare ASP IGN Entertainment Internet portal
Comtex News Network Online informediary ImproveNet Online home improvement e-market
CoolSavings Online direct marketer Infoseek Corp. Internet portal
Crosswalk.com Internet portal Inphonic, Inc. Online retailer
Cybergold Online direct marketer InsWeb Corp. Online insurance agency
Cyberian Outpost Online retailer INT Media Group Content site
Dice (Earthweb) Online recruiting site iPrint Technologies Online retailer
DrKoop.com Content site Launch Media Content site
Drugstore.com Online retailer LendingTree Online loan broker
E*Trade Group Online stock brokerage LifeMinders Online direct marketer
eBay Online auction house Liquid Audio Digital music delivery tech. provider
eChapman Internet portal LiveWorld Online community service provider
eCost.com, Inc. Online retailer Lycos Internet portal
EDGAR Online Online corporate filings MarketWatch.com Content site
Egreetings Network Online greeting cards McAfee.com Corp. Consumer software ASP
Mediconsult.com Content site Quotesmith.com Online insurance agency
Medscape Content site Redenvelope, Inc. Online retailer
Mortgage.com Online loan broker Register.com Internet domain name registration
MotherNature.com Online retailer Salon Media Group Content site
MP3.com Digital music/audio content Shanda Interactive Entertainment, Ltd. Online entertainment, games, wagering
Multex.com Content site Shopping.com, Ltd Online informediary
MyPoints.com Online direct marketer SmarterKids.com Online retailer
N2K Online retailer Sohu.com Internet portal
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Odimo, Inc. Online retailer Telocity Internet service provider
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Orbitz, Inc. Online travel agency uBid Online auction house
Overture Services Online direct marketer Uproar Online entertainment, games, wagering
PartsBase Online B2B marketplace Value America Online retailer
Paypal Online P2P payment Varsitybooks.com Online retailer
Peapod Online grocer Vistaprint, Ltd Online retailer
Planetout, Inc. Virtual community VitaminShoppe.com Online retailer
PlanetRx.com Online retailer Web Street Online stock brokerage
Preview Travel Online travel agency WebMD Corp./Healtheon Online healthcare transaction ASP
Priceline.com Online travel agency Webvan Group Online grocer
Provide Commerce, Inc. Online retailer Women.com Networks Content site
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